Dhir v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 903 : Federal Court Confirms Restoration Applications Filed After the 90-Day Deadline Must Be Refused

The Federal Court dismissed a judicial review challenging the refusal of applications to restore temporary resident status. The applicants argued that an earlier IRCC decision led them to believe they remained eligible for restoration despite filing a second restoration application outside the statutory deadline. The Court held that the 90-day restoration period under section 182 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR) is mandatory and cannot be extended by administrative error, misleading wording, or legitimate expectations.

Key Principle

An application to restore temporary resident status must be submitted within the 90-day period prescribed by section 182 of the IRPR. Once that deadline expires, immigration officers have no discretion to restore status, and administrative communications or legitimate expectations cannot create a substantive right contrary to the Regulations.

Background

The principal applicant and her spouse, both citizens of India, initially held valid work permits in Canada. Before their permits expired, they submitted new work permit applications. However, those applications were later withdrawn by their former representative, causing their temporary resident status to expire.

Twelve days after losing status, the applicants submitted restoration applications within the statutory 90-day period. Those applications were refused because they sought open work permits based on a permanent residence application for which they were ineligible. The refusal letter nevertheless stated that they were “eligible to restore” their status under section 182 of the IRPR.

Relying on that statement, the applicants filed a second restoration application several months later, after the 90-day restoration period had expired. IRCC refused the second application on the basis that it was filed outside the statutory deadline.

Court Findings

·         The 90-Day Restoration Period Is Mandatory

Justice Gleeson held that section 182 of the IRPR imposes a mandatory limitation period for restoration applications. Because the applicants filed their second restoration application well beyond the 90-day period following the loss of their temporary status, the officer was legally required to refuse the application.

The Court reaffirmed that officers possess no discretion to extend the statutory restoration deadline, regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

·         Earlier IRCC Wording Could Not Override the Regulations

The applicants argued that the wording in the first refusal letter reasonably led them to believe they remained eligible to apply again for restoration.

The Court acknowledged that the language used in the earlier decision may have been misleading. However, even if it created confusion, administrative communications cannot alter the legal requirements established by the IRPR. The officer was therefore not required to disregard the mandatory deadline simply because of the wording contained in an earlier refusal.

·         Legitimate Expectations Cannot Create Substantive Immigration Rights

The Court also rejected the applicants’ procedural fairness argument.

While the doctrine of legitimate expectations may protect procedural rights in appropriate circumstances, it cannot create substantive rights that are inconsistent with legislation or regulations. Since the Regulations required refusal of restoration applications filed outside the 90-day period, any expectation created by the earlier decision could not override that statutory requirement.

Outcome

The Federal Court dismissed the application for judicial review, concluding that the officer reasonably refused the restoration applications because they were filed after the mandatory 90-day period prescribed by section 182 of the IRPR. The decision reinforces that restoration timelines are strict statutory requirements and cannot be extended through administrative errors, equitable considerations, or legitimate expectations.

Case Citation:

Dhir v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 903 (CanLII)